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Abstract
The System for Automated Deduction (SAD) is developed in the framework of the Evidence
Algorithm research project and is intended for automated processing of mathematical texts. The
SAD system works on three levels of reasoning: (a) the level of text presentation where proofs are
written in a formal natural-like language for subsequent verification; (b) the level of foreground
reasoning where a particular theorem proving problem is simplified and decomposed; (c) the level of
background deduction where exhaustive combinatorial inference search in classical first-order logic
is applied to prove end subgoals.
We present an overview of SAD describing the ideas behind the project, the system’s design, and
the process of problem formalization in the fashion of SAD. We show that the choice of classical
first-order logic as the background logic of SAD is not too restrictive. For example, we can handle
binders like Σ or lim without resort to second order or to a full-powered set theory. We illustrate our
approach with a series of examples, in particular, with the classical problem
√
2 /∈ Q.
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In the early 1960s the Academician V. Glushkov initiated a series of researches aimed at
the development of a computer system that would be able to aid a working mathematician
to verify formally long but in some sense “evident” proofs (e.g. routine algebraic transfor-
mations superposed with applications of a number of definitions).
According to the initial idea three main components of the system should be: an infer-
ence engine that implements the basic level of evidence, an extensible collection of tools
that reinforce the basic engine and a powerful input language that must be close to the
natural mathematical language and easy to use. Thus, a statement is “evident” if it can be
proved by the system without any intervention of a user. So the more powerful is the sys-
tem, the larger the “evidence domain” is. One can hope to augment the system’s power by
adding new “reinforcement methods” (e.g., proof schemes, reasoning styles, etc.) as well
as by accumulating useful and frequently used mathematical knowledge.
The work began and an original theoretical basis for the inference engine was proposed
soon, which was called the Evidence Algorithm [1]. The background logic was classical
first-order logic. Note that the choice of logic predefined somehow a set-theoretical for-
malization style (as opposed to type-theoretical). Later, a version of the input language,
called Theory Language [2], was developed. Some steps towards more intelligent system
were made as well [3].
The project was really interesting and ambitious and required significant human and
computer resources (two of the three authors took part in the first research team that de-
veloped the project), and the life of the project turned to be hard. It was almost abandoned
in the beginning of 90th but fortunately restored several years later (thanks to perma-
nent efforts of one of the authors) and took the name “Evidence Algorithm” (EA) for
the whole [4].
The architecture of an ideal mathematical assistant from the viewpoint of EA could be
outlined as follows. A user communicates with the system with the help of texts written in
the above-mentioned high-level formal input language. She or he submits a problem like
“verify whether the given text is correct” or “how to prove the following statement”, or
“what is the given text about” and so on. The text, provided being syntactically correct,
is treated by the part of the system that we call “reasoner”. The reasoner analyzes the
problem and formulates a series of tasks that it submits to the inference engine, a prover. If
the prover succeeds, the resulting conclusion (e.g., proof trace) is given to the user and the
game is over. If it fails then a kind of “morbid anatomist” makes a diagnosis and supplies
it to the reasoner who tries to repair the situation. In particular, the reasoner can decide
that an auxiliary statement (lemma) might be useful and start the search for those in the
mathematical archives. To do that it submits a request to the archive service, we call it
“librarian”. After getting an answer the reasoner begins a new proof search cycle with the
modified problem and the process goes on.
The user can interact with the system by playing for the reasoner, librarian, for the
morbid anatomist (provided that she or he understands the internal prover’s life) or for the
prover itself, deciding whether a given conjecture should be considered as valid.
Below we present the current incarnation of the Evidence Algorithm, the System for Au-
tomated Deduction (SAD) [5,6], in its current state of development. We start by describing
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introduction to ForTheL, the input language of SAD (Section 3), followed by a kind of tu-
torial on how to formalize “live” texts (Section 4). In Section 5, we explain the verification
procedure and define the notion of a correct ForTheL text. Section 6 demonstrates how to
go beyond the first-order setting imposed by the background logic of SAD: we study for-
malization issues for operations that bind variables. The native inference engine of SAD
is described in Section 7. We conclude with a brief review of related approaches and an
outline of the future work.
2. Architecture of SAD
In the domain of mathematical assistance we distinguish two main groups of prob-
lems, which we can describe as “knowledge management” and “knowledge application”.
The first group includes organization of libraries of mathematical facts, search for relevant
information, communication with external mathematical services, and, probably, user in-
terface. Problems from the second group may vary, depending on a mathematical assistant
in question: proof planning, equation solving, or text verification.
The SAD system in its current state is focused on knowledge application problems.
A mathematical archive of SAD and the tools to interact with external mathematical ser-
vices are under development. Three main services provided by SAD are:
• inference search in classical first-order logic;
• theorem proving in the context of a self-contained mathematical text;
• verification of a self-contained mathematical text.
In what follows, we will talk about the inference search mode, the theorem proving mode,
and the text verification mode of SAD. Each mode relies on the previous ones: theorem
proving in SAD resorts to inference search if needed, and verification of a text consists in
proving a number of separate conjectures in the frame of that text.
In order to explain how a mathematical problem can be formalized and processed in
SAD, let us consider in more detail its verification mode. We relate the stages of this
process to the parts of the SAD design scheme (Fig. 1).
Fig. 1. The architecture of SAD.
A. Lyaletski et al. / Journal of Applied Logic 4 (2006) 560–591 563A user, which we call an author, starts by writing a ForTheL text, containing the prob-
lem itself (e.g., a theorem or a number of theorems), the relevant information (problem
specific lemmas, definitions, axioms), and the common preliminary facts used throughout
the text and called preliminaries below (e.g., general properties of sets or numbers). Any
claim in the text may be supplied with a proof. Preparation of a ForTheL text is entirely
manual, no assistance is provided for this stage. In Sections 4, 5, 6 we give several ex-
amples that demonstrate how a problem written in natural language can be converted to a
ForTheL text.
Now, the SAD system enters the scene. The parser module [ForTheL] analyzes the struc-
ture of the input text, defined with the help of the ForTheL markup, and the syntax of
sentences. Then the parser translates the text into its internal representation. In this repre-
sentation, the initial structure is made more straightforward (for example, in the proof by
case analysis, the disjunction of the case hypotheses is explicitly added as a goal). Also,
ForTheL statements are rendered to annotated formulas. Though the result of translation
is a collection of internal data structures, it corresponds to a ForTheL text, too—not the
original input text, but some straightened, normalized version of it.
In order to verify a submitted ForTheL text (see Section 5), the system transforms its
normalized version into a series of goal statements, which must be deduced from their
predecessors in the text. Thus text verification is reduced to theorem proving.
The goal statements are processed one by one by the module [Reason], the foreground
reasoner of SAD. Given a proof task—a statement to prove along with the list of its logical
predecessors in the text under consideration—the reasoner tries to simplify it in various
ways: to decompose it to a number of smaller subtasks (e.g., to split a conjunctive goal or
to perform a case analysis), to filter the set of premises, to generate suitable instantiations
of relevant lemmas, to expand definitions, and so on.
Thus, the reasoner is a kind of automated heuristic based prover, supplied with a col-
lection of proof task transformation rules. This collection is not intended to be a complete
logic calculus. The purpose of the reasoner is not to find the entire proof on its own, but
to prepare the inference search tasks for the background prover of SAD. The latter is a
combinatorial automated prover in classical first-order logic, whose duty is to complete
the proofs started by the reasoner. If the background prover fails to find the inference at
some instant, the reasoner may continue the proof task transformation or try an alternative
way, or just reject the text.
The richer the reasoner’s collection of transformation rules is, the more complex proof
tasks it can fulfill, the more coarse-grained and terse mathematical texts can be verified
by the system. The simplest reasoner would just send the received proof task to the back-
ground prover—that was the point where the development of SAD has started. At present,
the capabilities of [Reason] are still quite poor: it performs propositional goal splitting and
implements a simple variant of definition expansion strategy.
The native background prover of SAD, called [Moses], is based on a special goal-
driven sequent calculus, described in Section 7. The prover explores the search space
using bounded depth-first search with iterative deepening and backtracking, it uses con-
straints and folding-up [7] to increase the efficiency of search. In order to provide SAD
with equality handling, [Moses] implements a variation of Brand’s modification method
[8]. The original notion of admissible substitution used in the calculus allows to preserve
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can be sent to a specialized solver, e.g., an external computer algebra system (CAS).
We call [Moses] native, because the background prover is supposed to be independent
of SAD by design, so that an external theorem proving system (TPS), such as Otter [9],
SPASS [10], or Vampire [11] could be used. We made a number of experiments with
SPASS and some of them are presented in the paper (Section 4.3).
Being started in the inference search mode, SAD accepts the input texts written directly
in first-order language. The modules [FOL] and [TPTP] are parsers that process the native
first-order syntax of SAD and the TPTP-syntax, respectively. The second format is used
in the well-known TPTP library that contains several thousands of logical problems for
automated proof systems in classical first-order logic [12]. The SAD system can download
problems and axioms directly from the web-site of the TPTP library. Of course, one can
submit her or his own problem in the syntax of TPTP.
Dashed lines in Fig. 1 reflect some links to be implemented in future: cooperation with
external computer algebra systems and automated translation of the inferences found by
the reasoner and/or the prover to ForTheL.
The SAD system is implemented in Haskell [13] and C. It can be used online on the site
of the project (http://ea.unicyb.kiev.ua) or downloaded from there.
3. Introduction to the ForTheL language
ForTheL (Formal Theory Language) [14] is intended for representation of mathematical
texts including axioms, definitions, theorems and proofs. In this section, we provide a brief
informal introduction to the language. The details of ForTheL can be found in the reference
manual [15].
ForTheL is designed to be close to the natural language of real-life mathematical pub-
lications issued by mathematicians. It was frequently discussed (see, for example, the
archives of the QED Project [16]) that it would be nice to get a formal language that is
both formal and resembles a natural one, and we do not want to repeat here all pro and
contra. We will only mention two reasons that were important for us while deciding to
pursue a verbose “natural” style instead of using the unified notation of some traditional
logical language.
The first reason is to provide our framework with a user-friendly interface. A text com-
posed with correct English sentences will hopefully be more readable and easier to write
than a collection of formulas built with quantifiers, parentheses, lambdas, junctors, and
so on.
Second, we share the viewpoint that a text written in human language and in a traditional
mathematical style usually contains a useful information which lies beyond the scope of
classical logic. For example, we distinguish definitions from axioms, theorems from in-
termediate statements inside a proof, and we tend to use them in different ways when
learning and understanding a text. Sentences in natural language contain nouns, which de-
note classes of entities; adjectives and verbs, which act as attributes and restrict classes;
adjectives and verbs, which act as predicates and may relate different entities. However,
where human language makes distinctions, the language of mathematical logic unifies.
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icates disappear and first-order atoms appear instead.
Our intention is to preserve these distinctions in the formalization. We investigate how a
human mathematician treats definitions as compared with axioms or lemmas, class nouns
as compared with adjectives, proofs by case analysis as compared with proofs that follow
other schemes, and so on. Taking these observations into account, we hope to improve
the reasoning capabilities of a machine, to implement heuristic routines directing proof
search or reducing a search space with the help of “non-logical” knowledge extracted from
a formal, yet natural-like input text.
The syntax of a ForTheL sentence follows the rules of English grammar. Sentences are
built of units: statements, predicates, notions (that denote classes of objects) and terms (that
denote individual entities). Units are composed of syntactical primitives: nouns which form
notions (e.g., “subset of”) or terms (“closure of”), verbs and adjectives which
form predicates (“belongs to”, “compact”), symbolic primitives that use a concise
symbolic notation for predicates and functions and allow to consider usual quantifier-
free first-order formulas as ForTheL statements. Some syntactical primitives (for example,
“equal to”) are predefined in ForTheL and the rest must be introduced with the help of
special instructions to the parser included in the text. Of course, just a little fragment of
English is formalized in the syntax of ForTheL.
In order to define the semantics of a sentence, it is sufficient to define the semantics
of a statement unit. The latter is determined by a series of transformations that con-
vert a ForTheL statement to a first-order formula—the formula image. For example, the
formula image of a simple statement “all closed subsets of any compact
set are compact” is:
∀A ((A is a set ∧ A is compact) ⊃
∀B ((B is a subset of A ∧ B is closed) ⊃ B is compact))
There are three kinds of sentences in ForTheL: assumptions, selections, and affirmations.
Assumptions are statements preceded with the words “let” or “assume that”. They
serve to declare variables or to provide some hypotheses for the following text. For exam-
ple, the following sentences are typical assumptions: “Let S be a nonempty set”,
“Suppose that m is greater than n”. Selections are formed by notion units
preceded with the words “take” or “choose”. They state the existence of representa-
tives of the mentioned notions and can be used to declare variables, too. Here follows an
example of a selection: “Take an even prime number X.”. Finally, affirmations
are just statements: “If p divides n - p then p divides n”.
A ForTheL text is a sequence of top-level sections (see Fig. 2). These sections—axioms,
definitions, and theorems—play in ForTheL the same role they do in usual mathematical
texts. Any top-level section consists of zero or more assumptions followed by an affirma-
tion.
An author can facilitate the verification process by supplying a proof for affirmations
in the text. A ForTheL proof is a sequence of assumptions, selections, affirmations (which
may have their own proofs), and compound low-level sections: cases and raw blocks. The
case sections occur in the proofs by case analysis. The raw blocks are used to structure a
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proof: to limit the scope of assumptions and variable declarations. ForTheL supports spe-
cial proof schemes like proof by contradiction, by case analysis, and by general induction.
The ForTheL sentences are considered as low-level sections, too. In particular, an affirma-
tion with proof is a compound section that contains the proof as a subsection.
Semantics of a ForTheL text, in what verification is concerned, is considered in Sec-
tion 5. We explicitly mention verification, since a ForTheL text can be processed in
different ways, depending on a problem being solved. For example, if the system wants
to mine some relevant information in the text in question, the text’s semantics would be
based on the hierarchy of notions and definitions rather than on logical precedence or for-
mula images.
The ForTheL language can be seen as a variant of controlled English. It has much in
common with Attempto Controlled English (ACE) [17] (though the semantics of a sen-
tence is different in ACE) and especially with Common Logic Controlled English (CLCE)
[18]. In fact, many ForTheL statements are well-formed CLCE statements with the same
meaning, and vice versa. However, ForTheL has a more elaborated concept of text which
captures reasoning in a natural deduction style. On the level of text, ForTheL is quite sim-
ilar to the language of Mizar [19] and Isar [20] (see Section 8).
Another approach to formalization of the commonly used mathematical language is
presented in Mathematical Vernacular of de Bruijn (see [21]) and its refinement, Weak Type
Theory (WTT) [22]. It is noteworthy that notions (“nouns”) and attributes (“adjectives”) in
WTT are particular weak types and participate in type derivations.
In what follows, we will see examples of ForTheL texts and find some additional infor-
mation on the language.
4. Formalization in SAD as seen by a user
The formal proof of the fact that
√
2 is not a rational number is a classical touchstone
problem formalized in many mathematical assistants [23]. We have chosen its generalized
version to demonstrate step by step the whole cycle of formalization and verification in
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what kinds of reasoning are involved during verification, and how large (or short) are gaps
in a proof that the system can fill autonomously.
4.1. Comprehending the problem
The existence of numbers which cannot be represented as a fraction of two integers was
proved by mathematicians of the Pythagorean School who demonstrated that the diagonal
of a square with side 1 is not such a fraction. Here is the theorem in its traditional form:
Theorem.
√
2 is not rational.
Proof. Assume that
√
2 is rational. Then there exist relatively prime natural numbers n,
m such that
√
2 = n/m, and therefore, 2m2 = n2. Since n2 is even, n also is; say n = 2k.
Then 2m2 = 4k2, that is m2 = 2k2. Thus, m2 is even too, whence m is even. So, n and m
have a common nontrivial divisor in contradiction to our hypothesis. 
The claim can be easily generalized as follows:
Theorem. The square root of any prime number is not rational.
It is not surprising that the proof of this more general fact is in a manner more logical
though less straightforward (an auxiliary lemma is required):
Proof. Let p be a prime such that √p is rational. Then there exist relatively prime nat-
ural numbers n, m such that √p = n/m, and therefore, pm2 = n2. Since p is prime, p
divides n; say n = kp. Then pm2 = p2k2, that is m2 = pk2. Thus, p divides m2 and m.
So, n and m have a common nontrivial divisor and we have a contradiction. 
The fact that 2|n2 implies 2|n can be proved directly: (2k + 1)2 = 2(2k2 + 2k) + 1.
The generalized statement (p|n2 ⊃ p|n) is not that obvious. So, in order to make our
proof verifiable, we involve the following lemma (PDP stands for “Prime that Divides a
Product”):
Lemma PDP. Let m, n be natural numbers and p be a prime. If p divides mn then p
divides m or n.
Proof. We proceed by induction on (m+n+p). If m p then p|mn implies p|(m−p)n
and we apply the induction hypothesis (p|m − p obviously implies p|m). In the same
manner we treat the case n p.
Say m,n < p and pk = mn. If k is zero or one, the lemma’s statement is immediately
proved. Otherwise, let r be a prime divisor of k. Then r divides mn and, therefore r|m or
r|n, using the induction hypothesis and the fact that r  k < p.
If r divides m then p(k/r) = (m/r)n and the induction hypothesis is applicable. Obvi-
ously, p|(m/r) implies p|m. We treat the case r|n in the same way. 
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preliminary facts, including, in the order of introduction: basic properties of natural num-
bers (addition, subtraction, and ordering), some Euclidean arithmetic (divisibility, quotient,
primes and relative primes), definitions of a rational number and square root. These pre-
liminaries are well-known properties of well-known mathematical objects and we can take
them for granted.
4.2. ForTheL’ization
The mathematical notation used in our example is quite simple. Thus it suffices just to
reduce the syntax to ASCII character set and to get rid of some syntactic sugar in order to
write down this text in ForTheL. For the sake of brevity, we do not cite the preliminaries.
In the rest of the paper, we will refer to the following ForTheL fragment as to the Square
Root Text.
Lemma PDP. For all natural numbers n,m,p
if p is prime and p | n * m then p | n or p | m.
Proof by induction on ((n + m) + p).
Let n,m,p be natural numbers.
Assume that p is prime and p divides n * m.
Case p <= n.
p divides (n - p) * m and n - p < n.
Then p divides n - p or p divides m.
If p divides n - p then p divides n.
end.
Case p <= m.
p divides n * (m - p) and m - p < m.
Then p divides n or p divides m - p.
If p divides m - p then p divides m.
end.
Case n < p and m < p.
Take a natural number k such that n * m = p * k.
Case k = 0 \/ k = 1. Obvious.
Case k != 0 /\ k != 1.
Take a prime divisor r of k.
r divides n * m and r <= k and k < p.
Then r divides n or r divides m.
Case r divides n.
p divides (n / r) * m and (n / r) < n.
Then p divides (n / r) or p divides m.
If p divides (n / r) then p divides n.
end.
Case r divides m.
p divides n * (m / r) and (m / r) < m.
Then p divides n or p divides (m / r).
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end.
end.
end.
qed.
Theorem Main. Let p be a prime natural number.
For no rational number q the square of q is p.
Proof by contradiction.
Let q be a rational number such that q * q = p.
Take relatively prime natural numbers n,m such
that q * m = n.
Then p * (m * m) = (n * n).
Hence p divides n * n and p divides n.
Choose a natural number k such that n = p * k.
Then we have p * (m * m) = p * (k * n).
The square of m is equal to (p * k) * k.
Hence p divides m * m and p divides m.
We have a contradiction.
qed.
The text above is a syntactically valid ForTheL text. Moreover, being supplied with
suitable preliminary facts, this text is probably correct, meaning that every statement in
it can be deduced from its logical predecessors (so far, we do not precise what are the
statements to be proved and which predecessors they have). We say “probably”, because
this ForTheL fragment just reflects the proofs written above in natural language and we
believe those proofs to be correct; however, we cannot be completely sure in any one of
these two claims, so the formal verification is required.
Let us explain how a text in natural language is converted to ForTheL. First of all, we
add explicit structural markup. Proofs, subproofs, cases should have explicit headers and
endings. Note that SAD does not support proof by analogy, so we have to write twice
almost the same reasoning in the proof of Lemma PDP (compare the cases “p <= n” and
“p <= m”; “r divides n” and “r divides m”).
Since our motivation is not to show the existence of irrational numbers, but just to prove
a property of primes, we can slightly simplify the reasoning by eliminating some operations
which we use sporadically, such as square root or division on rational numbers.
We remove some reminders for a human reader—such as “Since p is prime”—since
they do not help a reasoner to find a proof (indeed, the system will not forget that p
is prime), and therefore are not included in the syntax of ForTheL (they may be easily
added on the user’s request). On the other hand, we may have to add some supplementary
statements which would seem superfluous to a reader but make the automated verification
possible (see Section 4.3).
Finally, since ForTheL formalizes just a small fragment of English (even “scientific
English”), there are some natural expressions that should be reformulated. For example,
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have to say “p divides m2 and p divides m” instead of “p divides m2 and m”.
In conclusion, let us give some explanations on using induction in SAD. Proofs by in-
duction do not have any particular structure in ForTheL; for example, there is no special
markup for the base case and the step case. A proof section is considered as a proof by in-
duction whenever it satisfies the following conditions. The section begins with the header
“proof by induction on term”. The goal must be a universally quantified for-
mula of the form ∀vF and the free variables of the induction term (say, t) must be in v.
These variables must be declared in the beginning of the proof section in the same way as
they are described in the goal. If these requirements are satisfied then the parser formulates
and inserts in the proof the appropriate induction hypothesis:
∀u(t[u/v] —< t ⊃ F [u/v])
Here, the binary relation —< stands for an abstract well-founded ordering, as explained
below. In other words, the hypothesis can be formulated as follows: the property being
proved holds for all the values of the induction term that are less than the current one with
respect to a fixed well-founded ordering.
If we succeed to prove the property for the current value of the induction term in pres-
ence of the induction hypothesis, we can conclude that the property holds for all values of
that term and the initial goal is thus proved. In other words, ForTheL applies the general
induction principle.
Since there is no finite axiomatization of well-foundness in first-order logic, the SAD
system can by no means check whether a given user-defined ordering is well-founded.
Instead, ForTheL provides a special binary predicate symbol -<- which is used as an
abstract a priori well-founded relation in induction arguments. It is left to the author to
write down the axioms defining particular properties of the relation -<-, and the system
will take for granted that the supplied axioms are compatible with well-foundness.
In the current example, the corresponding axiom is:
Axiom IH. For all natural numbers n,m (n < m => n -<- m).
and the induction hypothesis for the proof of PDP is as follows:
For all natural numbers N,M,P
if ((N + M) + P) -<- ((n + m) + p)
then if P is prime and P | N * M then P | N or P | M.
4.3. Filling the gaps
Despite our confidence in the correctness of the Square Root Text, SAD fails to verify it.
The reasoning capabilities of the system are too weak to establish automatically the truth
of the very first affirmation in the proof of Lemma PDP: “p divides (n - p) * m”,
the fourth line of the proof. In fact, almost all the affirmations in the Square Root Text will
not be proved as they are.
Generally, there are several ways to make an affirmation more “evident” to the system.
The simplest one is to provide it with references, a list of top-level premises to use in
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the proof search.1 When your problem has a large set of preliminaries, such an explicit
filtering of premises can be very helpful, reducing the search time from half an hour to
half a second. Note that a top-level fact mentioned in references is not required to actually
contribute to the found proof.
However, the exact list of needed premises can be sometimes hard to find (in fact, the
author has to foresee the proof) and can turn out to be quite long, making the text unnatural.
Finally, it may happen that even if the set of premises is filtered, the prover still fails to find
the proof. The needed proof step may be just too large.
Another way is to insert an intermediate statement which is easier to verify than the
affirmation in question (say, A) and which may shorten the proof of A. The author may
provide a proof section for A and put there not just a single statement but the whole in-
termediate reasoning. The rule of thumb is as follows: if your intermediate argument P is
going to be used merely to support verification of A then place P in a subproof; if it can
help to verify other claims in the current proof section, too, then put P above A, so that
P will be a premise for the rest of the section; if P reappears several times in your proof
under different instantiations, then make it a top-level lemma.
The needed level of detail is usually found by trial and error, until the problematic
affirmation becomes checkable. Of course, this level strongly depends on the reasoner and
the prover being used. Therefore, some knowledge about the deductive machinery of SAD
can help the author in preparation of a verifiable text. In hard cases, the author may have
to revise the whole proof and the set of preliminaries.
Let us consider the first case section in the proof of Lemma PDP in its final, verifiable
state:
Case p <= n.
Let us show that p divides (n - p) * m and n - p < n.
n = p + (n - p) and n * m = p * ((n * m) / p).
n * m = (p * m) + ((n - p) * m) (by AMDistr).
p divides (n - p) * m (by DefDiv, DivMin).
end.
Then p divides n - p or p divides m (by IH).
Indeed ((n - p) + m) + p < (n + m) + p (by MonAdd). end.
If p divides n - p then p divides n (by DefDiv,DivSum).
end.
Let us compare the case section above with the corresponding one in the Square Root
Text. It consists of the same three affirmations which are now provided with subproofs
and references. Note that purely algebraic tasks turn to be difficult for a generic first-order
prover (especially in presence of the axioms of associativity, commutativity, and distribu-
1 However, the author can explicitly mark some frequently used top-level facts as persistent, making them
participate in each proof search.
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Another subgoal, n − p < n, does not require any support from us. On the other hand,
SAD fails to deduce ((n−p)+m)+p < (n+m)+p from n−p < n on its own, and we
have to mention it explicitly in a subproof in order to apply the induction hypothesis.
Other “hard” affirmations in the text are processed in a similar way. At the end, the proof
of Lemma PDP becomes twice longer than the initial one. At the same time, the proof of
the main theorem does not grow, since we can make it verifiable just by referencing the
necessary preliminary facts:
Theorem Main. Let p be a prime natural number.
For no rational number q the square of q is p.
Proof by contradiction.
Let q be a rational number such that q * q = p.
Take relatively prime natural numbers n,m such
that q * m = n.
Then p * (m * m) = (n * n) (by MulAsso,MulComm).
Hence p divides n * n and p divides n (by DefDiv,PDP).
Choose a natural number k such that n = p * k (by DefDiv).
Then we have p * (m * m) = p * (k * n) (by MulAsso).
The square of m is equal to (p * k) * k
(by MulComm,MulCanc).
Hence p divides m * m and p divides m
(by MulAsso,DefDiv,PDP).
We have a contradiction (by DefRelPr).
qed.
In its final state, the ForTheL text about square roots of prime numbers consists of 205
non-blank lines: 126 lines of preliminaries and 79 lines for Lemma PDP and the main
theorem. The text contains 95 goals (lemmas in preliminaries taken into account, too) and
is fully verified by SAD using SPASS [10] as the background prover in 45 seconds (0.5
sec/goal on average, 4.7 seconds for the longest session).
Some other interesting problems formalized and verified in SAD are Finite and Infinite
Ramsey Theorems, a series of theorems about a particular notion of refinement, Cauchy-
Bunyakowski-Schwarz (CBS) inequality for real vectors, Chinese Remainder Theorem, a
criterion of series convergence (see Section 6).
5. Text verification
Let us demonstrate how does SAD work on a fragment taken from the proof of Lemma
PDP. We consider the innermost case analysis where the “gaps” are not filled yet:
Case r divides n.
p divides (n / r) * m and (n / r) < n.
Then p divides (n / r) or p divides m.
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Case r divides m.
p divides n * (m / r) and (m / r) < m.
Then p divides n or p divides (m / r).
If p divides (m / r) then p divides m.
end.
The process of translation reveals the semantics of different proof methods and encodes
it in the structure of the resulting text. If we leave individual sentences as they are and
translate only the compound sections, the text above will be translated (or normalized, in
terms of [15]) into the following one:
p | n or p | m. # 1
proof.
r divides n or r divides m. # 2
if r divides n then p | n or p | m. # 3
proof.
let r divide n.
p divides (n / r) * m and (n / r) < n. # 4
Then p divides (n / r) or p divides m.
If p divides (n / r) then p divides n.
p | n or p | m.
end.
if r divides m then p | n or p | m. # 5
proof.
let r divide m. # 6
p divides n * (m / r) and (m / r) < m. # 7
Then p divides n or p divides (m / r).
If p divides (m / r) then p divides m.
p | n or p | m.
end.
end.
As we see, the sequence of case sections is transformed to a proof of the statement
“p | n or p | m”. Why this one? The reason is that it was the current goal when the
case analysis started.
The current goal is a statement associated to each position inside a proof section.
Roughly, it is the statement being proved in that position. Let us consider how the cur-
rent goal evolves in the proof of Lemma PDP. At the beginning of the proof, the cur-
rent goal is “for all natural numbers n,m,p if p is prime and p |
n * m then p | n or p | m”. After the first assumption, which declares the vari-
ables n, m, and p as natural numbers, the current goal is reduced to “if p is prime
and p | n * m then p | n or p | m”. After the second assumption, the cur-
rent goal is reduced further to “p | n or p | m”. Assumptions that modify the current
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and we will return to them later.
So at the moment when the case analysis under consideration starts, the current goal is
still “p | n or p | m”. Therefore the translated text has the form of the affirmation
“p | n or p | m” supplied with a proof section.
Before considering particular cases, the reasoner must ensure that the case analysis is
exhaustive, that is, the disjunction of case hypotheses is valid. This disjunction becomes
the first affirmation in the proof section.
Each case section is translated to a proof of the affirmation of the form “if H then
G” where H is the case hypothesis and G is the current goal. At the beginning of the proof,
the current goal is set to this implication but the very first assumption “let H ” reduces it
back to G. Then the proof follows the lines of the original case section.
At the end of any proof section that came from the initial text or was obtained from a
case section, the translator puts the affirmation of the current goal (unless the proof sec-
tion already ends with an equivalent statement). Thus, both case sections end with the
affirmation “p | n or p | m”. Note that this affirmation is not put at the end of the
outer proof section, since the conducted case analysis gives itself the infallible proof of the
current goal.
The definitions below determine the semantics of ForTheL w.r.t. verification.
Definition 1. A section A is a logical predecessor of a section B in a normalized text T
whenever A textually precedes B and no section containing A textually precedes B .
Definition 2. Let  be a set of sections in a normalized text T and S be a ForTheL state-
ment. We say that S is a logical consequence of  whenever the formula image of S is a
logical consequence of the formula image of .
The formula image of  is the conjunction of images of sections from . The definition
of the formula image of a ForTheL section is quite long and we will not give it here in full.
The idea can be seen from the following examples. The image of an affirmation is the image
of the affirmed statement independently of the presence of a proof section. The image of
an assumption is the assumed statement. A two-sentence raw block of the form “block.
Let X be a N. Then S. end.” where X is a fresh variable, N , a notion, and S, a
statement, will have the image ∀X(FI(X is N) ⊃ FI(S)), where FI(X is N) and FI(S)
are the formula images of the corresponding statements.
Definition 3. An affirmation A in a normalized text T is correct whenever one of the
following conditions holds: (a) A occurs in an axiom or a definition; (b) A is supplied
with a proof section; (c) the statement of A is a logical consequence of the set of logical
predecessors of A in T.
Definition 4. A selection A in a normalized text T is correct whenever the existence of
representatives of the mentioned notions is a logical consequence of the set of logical
predecessors of A in T.
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In the normalized text on page 573, the affirmation #7 is logically preceded by sections
#2 (affirmation without proof), #3 (affirmation with a proof), and #6 (assumption). Af-
firmations #1 and #5 are not predecessors of #7 since we consider an affirmation with a
proof as a single section and, therefore, both #1 and #5 contain #7 and do not textually
precede it. The affirmation #4 and other sentences in that proof section are not predeces-
sors of #7 since the section #3 that contains # 4 and its neighbors precedes #7.
Thus, in order to confirm correctness of the Square Root Text, the reasoner must,
in particular, deduce “p divides n*(m/r) and (m/r) < m” from the set of
premises that contains “r divides m” (#6), “if r divides n then p|n or
p|m” (#3), “r divides n or r divides m” (#2), and other logical predecessors
of #7 outside the fragment under consideration.
Let us now return to motivated and unmotivated assumptions. Consider the following
ForTheL fragment:
Let us prove that any natural number n greater than 2 is odd.
Let n be a natural number greater than 2.
Assume that n is prime. Hence 2 does not divide n.
end.
The first assumption in the proof is certainly motivated and changes the current goal to “n
is odd”. The second one does not correspond to any part of the (new) current goal and
leaves it unchanged. Now, if we try to translate this fragment just as described above:
Any natural number n greater than 2 is odd.
Proof.
Let n be a natural number greater than 2.
Assume that n is prime. Hence 2 does not divide n.
n is odd.
end.
and apply the Definition 5, we will conclude that the fragment is correct while it is cer-
tainly not. The reason is that correctness of the current goal in the end of a proof implies
correctness of the statement being proved only if all the assumptions we made in the proof
were motivated. Therefore, we enclose unmotivated assumptions in raw blocks, and the
fragment in question is translated as follows:
Any natural number n greater than 2 is odd.
Proof.
Let n be a natural number greater than 2.
block.
Assume that n is prime. Hence 2 does not divide n.
end.
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end.
The newly introduced raw block section is equivalent to an affirmation “if n is
prime then 2 does not divide n”, which is correct but does not prove the final
“n is odd”.
Assumptions of the form “assume the contrary” or, in general, “assume
that H ” where H is equivalent to the negation of the current goal, are considered as
motivated and change the current goal to falsum, so that the subsequent reasoning must
lead to a contradiction.
To conclude: the ForTheL language determines what are the statements to verify and
what are the statements to use in any particular verification process. The reasoner and the
prover will accomplish the job.
6. Extending the scope: binding constructions
The SAD system relies a lot on the deductive power of its background prover. The
foreground reasoner of SAD can help the prover by simplifying the prover’s tasks but
its special methods and heuristics cannot replace extensive inference search. SAD uses
classical first-order logic for inference search. Therefore any construction we use in our
input texts should be either translatable into first order language (possibly, in some tricky
way) or must be excluded from the scope of the prover and handled by the reasoner or even
by the parser.
Let us now consider a more complex domain than that of natural numbers.
Theorem. Let (ai) be a nonnegative, monotone decreasing sequence of reals that con-
verges towards 0. Then the following series converges, too:
∞∑
i=0
(−1)iai .
Proof. First, we prove that for all N,d
0 (−1)N
N+d∑
i=N
(−1)iai  aN .
We proceed by induction on d . The base case of the induction (d = 0) is obvious. Let us
assume that the statement holds for d = k (and for arbitrary N ) and show that it also holds
for d = k + 1:
(−1)N
N+(k+1)∑
i=N
(−1)iai = aN −
(
(−1)N+1
(N+1)+k∑
i=N+1
(−1)iai
)
.
By induction hypothesis, the subtracted value lies between 0 and aN+1 which is not greater
than aN , hence the induction step is proved.
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n >N∣∣∣∣∣
n∑
i=0
(−1)iai −
N∑
i=0
(−1)iai
∣∣∣∣∣=
∣∣∣∣∣
n∑
i=N+1
(−1)iai
∣∣∣∣∣< ε.
Let us fix ε and take such N that for any n >N , an < ε (recall that (an) converges to zero).
Take some arbitrary n >N . Then we obtain
0
∣∣∣∣∣
n∑
i=N+1
(−1)iai
∣∣∣∣∣= (−1)N+1
n∑
i=N+1
(−1)iai  aN+1 < ε
and the theorem is proved. 
In this example, we deal with sequences and series which, in general, are second-order
objects. They occur throughout the proof, sometimes inside algebraic calculations, and we
cannot hope to eliminate all of them from the scope of the prover. So we must supply them
with a first-order semantics.
There are several first-order formalisms where functions and predicates are treated as
individual objects. First, we can build a subtheory of sequences and series in the frame of
some set theory. This approach would provide a common basis for many different domains.
The well-known system Mizar [19] uses it to construct a whole library of interrelated
mathematical texts.
However, when working with concepts defined in a set-theoretic style, we often have to
descend in definition expansion down to the membership relation. As a consequence, we
obtain proof tasks that are quite long (because of all the needed preliminaries) and where
numerous membership literals unify with each other. Combinatorial inference search is
unpractical for such problems. To cope just with sequences and series, a theory of sets is
too general.
We could also use the equational theory of combinators CL by Curry [24]. The binary
application operation and combinators S and K are sufficient to describe any computational
behavior that we can meet on the second-order level of traditional mathematics and beyond
that. Unfortunately, unification (i.e., term construction) in such a theory is very expensive;
two axioms of CL produce a lot of inferences and tend to explode the search space. In this
regard, they can be compared with the axioms of equality or with AC-axioms.
At the same time, the theory of combinators is also too general for our purposes: we
do not work with self-application, fixed points, uncomputable objects, or arbitrary high
orders. We would like to find a more specific set of combinators whose application during
inference search could be restricted.
Such a set of combinators can be found in the theory of recursive functions [25]; be-
sides, we need neither primitive recursion nor minimization. The problem is that we cannot
describe higher-order functions in such a theory without suitable encoding, e.g., gödeliza-
tion. However, if we weaken the recursion theory leaving just superpositions and add the
appropriate combinators for functions like
∑
or lim, we obtain what we need.
Before proceeding to definitions, consider a ForTheL version of the theorem:
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Let A[i] be a real number for every natural number i.
Assume that for every natural number i
(0 <= A[i] and A[i+1] <= A[i]).
Assume that A[i] converges wrt i to zero.
Then Sum(mn(i)*A[i],i,0,N) converges wrt N
to some real number.
Proof.
For all natural numbers N,d
0 <= mn(N) * Sum(mn(i)*A[i],i,N,N+d) and
mn(N) * Sum(mn(i)*A[i],i,N,N+d) <= A[N].
proof by induction on d.
Let N,d be natural numbers.
Case d = 0. Obvious.
Case d = k+1 for some natural number k.
Sum(mn(i)*A[i],i,N,N+d) =
(mn(N)*A[N]) + Sum(mn(i)*A[i],i,N+1,N+d).
Then mn(N) * Sum(mn(i)*A[i],i,N,N+d) =
A[N] - (mn(N+1) * Sum(mn(i)*A[i],i,N+1,N+d)).
We have 0 <= mn(N+1) * Sum(mn(i)*A[i],i,N+1,N+d) and
mn(N+1) * Sum(mn(i)*A[i],i,N+1,N+d)
<= A[N+1] (by IH).
A[N+1] <= A[N] and we have the thesis.
end.
end.
Let e be a positive real number.
Take a natural number N such that for every natural
number n if n > N then |A[n]| < e.
Let n be a natural number such that n > N.
Sum(mn(i)*A[i],i,0,n) =
Sum(mn(i)*A[i],i,0,N) + Sum(mn(i)*A[i],i,N+1,n).
We have 0 <= mn(N+1) * Sum(mn(i)*A[i],i,N+1,n).
Then |Sum(mn(i)*A[i],i,N+1,n)| =
mn(N+1) * Sum(mn(i)*A[i],i,N+1,n).
Hence |Sum(mn(i)*A[i],i,N+1,n)| <= A[N+1]
and |Sum(mn(i)*A[i],i,N+1,n)| < e.
|Sum(mn(i)*A[i],i,0,n) - Sum(mn(i)*A[i],i,0,N)| < e.
We have the thesis.
qed.
In the text above, mn(i) stands for (−1)i , Sum(mn(i)*A[i],i,0,n) denotes∑n
0(−1)iAi , and A[i] converges wrt i to zero means limAi = 0. The vari-
able A is a “second-order” variable, which are allowed only in terms of the form
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in premises and in goals, second-order variables are implicitly universally quantified.
In binding functions (Sum) or predicates (converges to) we mention the bound
variable as an ordinary argument. By definition of the corresponding syntactical primi-
tive, the parser knows which argument place holds a variable to bind, and so the term
Sum(mn(i)*A[i],i,0,n) will be translated to Sum(λi.mn(i)*A[i],0,n). Let
us denote this step by Iλ (introduction of λ).
Lambda terms are not allowed in the first-order language, so translation must proceed
and replace lambdas with combinator terms. In order to guarantee the consistency of our
formalization, we need to distinguish ordinary individual objects from individuals repre-
senting functions. Therefore we take, as the destination language, a many-sorted first-order
language where sorts are natural numbers: ordinary individuals have the sort 0, and each
lambda-abstraction on top of a term increments its sort by 1. In other words, a term of the
sort n is understood as a function of n arguments. Thus, all “second-order” variables ob-
tain the sort equal to their arity and the rest of variables (“first-order” ones) get the sort 0.
Each non-binding function symbol (such as mn(.)) obtains the sort 0×· · ·×0 → 0; each
non-binding predicate symbol obtains the sort 0 × · · · × 0. Only the variables of the sort 0
are allowed to be bound.
Then we extend the signature of our destination language with the following constants,
functions and predicates:
• for each non-binding function symbol f (such as mn(.)) with the arity n > 0, we add
a twin constant f n of the sort n;
• for all m,n such that 0 <m n, we add a projection constant Inm of the sort n;• for all m,n, we add a superposition function Snm of the arity (m + 1) and the sort
m × n × · · · × n → n; initial occurrences of application t[x1, . . . ,xm] are replaced
with S0m(t,x1, . . . ,xm);• for all n and each binding function symbol  (such as Sum(λi.,.,.)) with the
arity 1 + m, we add a special superposition function nm of the arity (m + 1) and the
sort (n+ 1)× n× · · · × n → n; initial occurrences of  are replaced with 0m;• for each binding predicate symbol Lim (such as λi. converges to.) with the
arity 1 + m we add a new predicate Limm of the arity (m + 1) and the sort 1 × 0 ×
· · · × 0; initial occurrences of Lim are replaced with Limm.
Fig. 3 shows the rules we apply to eliminate lambda. For example, the main statement
of the theorem above will be transformed as follows. Note that bound variables N and i
disappear in the final statement.
Sum(mn(i) ∗ A[i],i,0,N) converges wrt N to R
⇓ (by Iλ)
λN.Sum( λi.mn(i) ∗ A[i], 0,N) converges to R
⇓ (introduction of sort-indexed symbols)
λN.Sum02( λi.mn(i)∗S01(A,i), 0,N) (converges to)1 R
⇓ (by Eλf )
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1
2(∗2, λi.mn(i), λi.S01(A,i)),0,N) (converges to)1 R
⇓ (by Eλf,EλI)
λN.Sum02(S
1
2(∗2,S11(mn1, I 11 ), λi.S01(A,i)), 0,N) (converges to)1 R
⇓ (by EλS,EλK,EλI)
λN.Sum02(S
1
2(∗2,S11(mn1, I 11 ), S12(S21(A, I 21 ), I 11 , I 11 )), 0,N)
(converges to)1 R
⇓ (by Eλ,EλK,EλI)
Sum12(S
2
1( S
1
2(∗2, S11(mn1, I 11 ), S12(S21(A, I 21 ), I 11 , I 11 )), I 21 ),S10(0), I 11 )
(converges to)1 R
The final expression looks quite cumbersome. Such a natural and simple construction like
the initial statement surely should not turn into a hard-readable several-line bush of spe-
cial function symbols Sij and I
i
j . Can we simplify the translation using the properties of
superpositions and projections?
In Fig. 4, we introduce the axiom schemes varying over natural m,n, k, twin con-
stants fm, and special superpositions nm. These axioms constitute what we call the theory
of limited second-order superposition SP. The axioms of SP permit us to continue the
transformation above:
λu.u → I11 (EλI)
λu.s → Sn+1n (s, In+11 , . . . , In+1n ) (EλK)
λu.f (s1, . . . , sm) → S1m(fm,λu.s1, . . . , λu.sm) (Eλf )
λu.Snm(t, s1, . . . , sm) → Sn+1m+1(λu.t, λu.s1, . . . , λu.sm, In+1n+1 ) (EλS)
λu.nm(t, s1, . . . , sm) → n+1m (λu.t, λu.s1, . . . , λu.sm) (Eλ)
(rule EλK : s has the sort n and u does not occur in s)
Fig. 3. Rules of lambda-elimination.
(1)Snn(x, In1 , . . . , Inn ) = x
(2)Snm(Imk , x1, . . . , xm) = xk
(3)S0m(fm,x1, . . . , xm) = f (x1, . . . , xm)
(4)Snm(Smk (x, y1, . . . , yk), z1, . . . , zm) = Snk (x,Snm(y1, z1, . . . , zm), . . . ,Snm(yk, z1, . . . , zm))
(5)Snm(mk (x, y1, . . . , yk), z1, . . . , zm)
= nk (Sn+1m+1(x, In+11 ,Sn+1n (z1, In+12 , . . . , In+1n+1 ), . . . ,Sn+1n (zm, In+12 , . . . , In+1n+1 )),
Snm(y1, z1, . . . , zm), . . . ,Snm(yk, z1, . . . , zm))
Fig. 4. First-order theory of limited second-order superposition.
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2
1( S
1
2(∗2, S11(mn1, I 11 ), S12(S21(A, I 21 ), I 11 , I 11 )), I 21 ),S10(0), I 11 )
(converges to)1 R⇓ (1,4)
Sum12(S
2
1( S
1
2(∗2, mn1, S11(A,S12(I 21 , I 11 , I 11 ))), I 21 ),S10(0), I 11 )
(converges to)1 R⇓ (2)
Sum12(S
2
1( S
1
2(∗2, mn1, S11(A, I 11 )), I 21 ),S10(0), I 11 ) (converges to)1 R
⇓ (1)
Sum12(S
2
1( S
1
2(∗2, mn1, A), I 21 ), S10(0), I 11 ) (converges to)1 R
⇓ (4)
Sum12(S
2
2(∗2, S21(mn1, I 21 ), S21(A, I 21 )), S10(0), I 11 ) (converges to)1 R
Let us analyze the first argument of the relation (converges to). It has the sort one
and so is considered as an unary function which takes the index (say, N ) as the argument
and returns the N th sequence element. This element is evaluated by a binding function
Sum(λ.,.,.), but first we must evaluate its arguments. The term S10(0) denotes the
constant-zero unary function. That means that the second argument for Sum does not de-
pend on N . The term I 11 is the identity function. That means that the third argument is N
itself.
The first argument of Sum is a term of the sort 2: it takes the index (say, i) for the inner
sequence being summed and the index N . To evaluate it, we pass i and N to S21(mn
1, I 21 )
(resulting in mn(i)) and to S21(A, I 21 ) (resulting in S01(A, i)). And the first argument of
Sum—the ith element of the inner sequence—will be evaluated to (mn(i) ∗ S01(A, i)) as
it should be.
Main properties of the theory SP are as follows.
Lemma 6. Let t be a SP-term of the sort n and s1, . . . , sn be SP-terms of the sort k, and u
be a variable of the sort 0. Then the following holds in SP:
Skn+1
(
λu.t, s1, . . . , sn,Sk0(u)
)=SP Skn(t, s1, . . . , sn).
Corollary 7 (Consistency of abstraction). Let t, s1, . . . , sn be SP-terms of the sort 0 and
u1, . . . , un be variables of the sort 0 that do not occur in s1, . . . , sn. Then the following
equality is true in SP:
S0n(λun · · ·λu1.t, s1, . . . , sn) =SP t[s1/u1, . . . , sn/un].
Proposition 8 (Scope of SP). For any SP-term t of the sort n there exists a term t ′ in the
source language that does not contain free variables, except maybe those of t and first-
order variables u1, . . . , un, such that
λu1 · · ·λun.t ′ =SP t.
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those expressions with binding constructions and second-order variables which we can
write in ForTheL. This is the difference between SP and the general theory of combinators
CL.
Unfortunately, direct application of the SP axioms in inference search is not very fruit-
ful. Similar to the case of CL, unification is very expensive in SP and an author has to
include in his text almost all the intermediate steps of SP transformations. Moreover, to
cope with SP we need a prover supporting sorts which is rarely the case. At present, we are
working on a mechanism to generate the appropriate instantiations for second-order vari-
ables before launching the prover, which could permit to reduce or to eliminate completely
the use of SP axioms during inference search.
7. Proof search in SAD
It was mentioned above that a special sequent formalism was developed and imple-
mented in [Moses], the prover of SAD. In order to make this paper self-contained, we give
a brief description of a certain modification GD’ of the calculus GD introduced in [26] and
used in [Moses].
7.1. Admissible substitutions
We work in classical first-order logic with negation (¬), conjunction (∧), disjunction
(∨), implication (⊃), universal and existential quantifiers (∀ and ∃).
Let  be a set of closed formulas such that no two quantifiers in  bind the same variable
(a collision-free set). Let V be the set of indexed variables {kv | v occurs in , k ∈ N}. The
expression kF will denote the formula F with each variable v replaced with an indexed
variable kv.
We write F G+ (F G−) to denote a formula F with a positive (respectively, neg-
ative) occurrence of a subformula G. A variable kv ∈ V is said to be unknown in 
(kv ∈ V+) if for some formula P ∈ , P (∀vF)+ or P (∃vF)−. Correspondingly, x is
said to be fixed in  (kv ∈ V−) if for some P ∈ , P (∀vF)− or P (∃vF)+. Obviously,
each variable in V is either unknown or fixed in . Below, we typeset fixed variables in
bold: kv.
The set  induces a relation ≺: V+ × V− as follows: ku ≺ mw if and only if k = m
and the quantifier on w occurs in the scope of the quantifier on u in , that is, some formula
F ∈  is of the form (. . .Q1u(. . .Q2w(. . .) . . .) . . .).
Given a substitution σ , we define another relation ≺≺σ: V− ×V+ as follows: mw≺≺σku
if and only if mw occurs in kuσ .
A substitution σ is admissible in  whenever the following conditions hold:
(1) for any fixed kw ∈ V− , kwσ = mw, for some index m;
(2) for any kw,mw ∈ V− , ku ∈ V+ , if kwσ = mwσ and ku ≺ kw, then kuσ = muσ ;
(3) the transitive closure of the composition (≺≺σ ◦ ≺) is irreflexive.
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Proposition 9. Let  be a collision-free set of closed formulas. The set ′ is obtained
from  by erasing all the quantifiers in formulas (so that all the variables in ′ are free).
The set  is consistent if and only if for any n ∈ N and any finite admissible substitution σ
in the signature of , the set {1′, . . . , n′}σ is consistent.
7.2. Inference rules
The calculus GD’ deals with a-sequents, which are expressions of the form [] → G,
where  is a list of literals, called framed literals,  is a set of formulas, called premises,
and G is a goal formula. In our setting,  and G contain indexed variables, and  contains
non-indexed variables.
When a proof of an initial a-sequent is searched in GD’, an inference tree is constructed.
At the beginning of a search process the tree consists of the initial a-sequent. The tree grows
from top to bottom, with the subsequent nodes generated in accordance with the inference
rules of GD’.
At some moments of inference, branches in the tree may be terminated: a leaf node
containing an equation of the form 〈L1 ≈ L2〉 (where L1,L2 are literals) is added to such
a branch and no more expansions are possible on it.
By F¬ we denote the negation of F with the negation sign moved inside F :
(∀xP )¬ = ∃x¬P (P ∨Q)¬ = ¬P ∧ ¬Q (P ⊃ Q)¬ = P ∧ ¬Q
(∃xP )¬ = ∀x¬P (P ∧Q)¬ = ¬P ∨ ¬Q (¬P)¬ = P A¬ = ¬A
Fig. 5 summarizes the inference rules of GD’. In the figure, A,B denote unifiable atoms
and L,M denote unifiable literals. The expression ∗F stands for kF where k is a fresh
index with respect to the whole inference tree. Recall that premises are considered as un-
ordered and frame literals, as ordered, so that L denotes the last literal in [,L].
The following goal-drivenness constraint is applied to the inferences in GD’. Whenever
an AG-rule is applied and the atom A (or its negation) goes to the end of the list of framed
literals, the corresponding occurrence of B in ∗F¬ must be fixed and remembered. We re-
quire that the subsequent applications of goal-splitting rules never remove that occurrence
of B from the proof. In other words, that occurrence of B must form a literal goal after a
number of splittings. Then, we require the branch containing this goal to be terminated by
an application of TR-rule, with the equation 〈A ≈ B〉 in the leaf.
7.3. Proof trees
Let us consider an inference tree T where every branch is terminated. Let  denote the
set of premises in the initial a-sequent. Let E denote the overall system of equations in the
leaves of the tree.
The inference tree T is considered to be a proof tree whenever there exists a substitution
σ , admissible in , which is a solution for E (that is, Eσ is a set of identities). The initial
a-sequent of a proof tree is called deducible in GD’.
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(→ ∀): [] → ∀xF[] → F (→ ∃):
[] → ∃xF
[] → F
(→⊃)1: [] → F ⊃ G[] → G (→⊃)2:
[] → F ⊃ G
[] → F¬
(→ ∨)1: [] → F ∨G[] → G (→ ∨)2:
[] → F ∨G
[] → F
(→ ∧): [] → F ∧G[] → F [] → G (→ ¬):
[] → ¬F
[] → F¬
Auxiliary-Goal Rules (AG)
(AG+): [],F B
+ → A
[,¬A],F → ∗F¬ (AG
−): [],F B
− → ¬A
[,A],F → ∗F¬
Termination Rules (TR)
(T R):
[1,M,2] → L
〈M ≈ L〉 (T R):
[],M → L
〈∗M ≈ L〉
Fig. 5. Inference rules of GD’.
Proposition 10 (Soundness and completeness of GD’). Let  be a consistent set of formulas
and G be a formula. The sequent  → G is deducible in Gentzen’s calculus LK [27] if
and only if the a-sequent [ ],¬G → 0G is deducible in the calculus GD’.
Note that equation solving is separated from application of inference rules. Equations
may be accumulated and sent to a solver in an arbitrary moment. This property of GD’
allows to organize a flexible proof search procedure. Due to the absence of preliminary
skolemization, the initial signature is preserved and, therefore, we can use a relevant
domain-oriented solver. The submodule of [Moses] responsible for equation handling acts
as a mediator between the prover and external solvers. It checks a substitution found by a
solver for admissibility and builds additional equations if necessary. The procedure com-
puting the most general unifier is used as a solver by default.
7.4. GD’ as a clausal tableau calculus
Let us demonstrate the deductive technique of SAD on a simple propositional problem.
Assume that we want to prove the sequent A ∨ (B ∨ A) → A ∨ B . Let  = {A ∨ (B ∨
A),¬(A ∨ B)}. A GD’-inference used to prove the a-sequent [ ] → A ∨ B is shown in
Fig. 6.
Note that in any GD’-inference the premises are the same in each a-sequent. Moreover,
the list of framed literals in a given node is exactly the list of the complements of literal
goals above that node. Then we can present the proof tree given above in a quite abbre-
viated form, as the tree of literal goals. In the inference shown in Fig. 7, applications of
the auxiliary-goal rule are joined with the subsequent applications of goal-splitting rules
in a single inference step, and termination by a framed literal becomes termination by a
contradiction in a branch.
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Fig. 7. Abbreviated proof tree in GD’.
Start rule (SR) [ ] → G[ ] → L¬1 · · · [ ] → L¬n
Auxiliary-Goal Rules (AG)
(AG+): [] → A〈¬A ≈ kL¬〉 [,¬A] → kL¬1 · · · [,¬A] → kL¬n
(AG−): [] → ¬A〈A ≈ kL¬〉 [,A] → kL¬1 · · · [,A] → kL¬n
Termination Rules (TR)
(T R):
[1,M,2] → L
〈M ≈ L〉 (T R):
[],M → L
〈kM ≈ L〉
Fig. 8. Inference rules of GD’ (reformulation).
Consider now the clauses resulting from a “naive” clausification of :
Cls() = {A∨B ∨A, ¬A, ¬B}.
We see that literals expanding non-leaf nodes in the abbreviated proof tree come from the
complemented clauses above. In fact, the goal-splitting rules of GD’ are exactly the rules of
“naive” clausification (with the only difference that quantifiers are ignored and no Skolem
symbols arise). Then we can reformulate our calculus as shown in Fig. 8.
In the start rule, (L1 ∨ · · · ∨ Ln) is one of the clauses from Cls(¬G). In the auxiliary-
goal rules, (L ∨ L1 ∨ · · · ∨ Ln) belongs to Cls(). In the auxiliary-goal and termination
rules, k is a fresh index with respect to the whole inference. Note that the goal-drivenness
constraint is now incorporated in the AG-rules.
Now, since premises and framed literals can be omitted and we can work directly with
trees of literals our reformulation of GD’ becomes just a sequent-based counterpart of the
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is still a difference in quantifier handling: GD’ uses the notion of admissible substitution
instead of skolemizing initial formulas.
8. Related approaches and systems
We find convenient to consider the variety of existing approaches with respect to three
characteristics: the style of formalization they suggest, the style of proof they require, and
the granularity of proof they accept. We will try to show the place of the SAD system in
this three-dimensional space.
Formalization style By this, we mean the choice of preliminaries, the form of definitions
(whether they are recursive), the way of reasoning (whether it is constructive, or strictly
typed, or calculation-based), and so on. It is obvious that this style is influenced, above all,
by the choice of the base logic and of fundamental theories used in formalizations.
At present, two main trends consist in adopting higher-order logic (type theory) and
first-order logic (set theory). Types are used in the majority of the well-known mathemat-
ical assistants such as Isabelle/HOL [28], Coq [29], 	MEGA [30], PVS [31], HOL [32],
Automath [33], λCLAM [34], and others. The type-theoretic approach favors inductively
defined domains, recursive definitions and is completely natural to formalize the concepts
of programming or engineering. It is, probably, not so natural for traditional mathemat-
ics [35]—not denying that most of the mentioned systems accumulate a vast collection of
purely mathematical theories.
On the other side we see the system Mizar [19] that uses classical first-order logic and
Tarski-Grothendieck set theory. This approach corresponds well to the traditional style of
mathematical presentation and the Mizar Mathematical Library constitutes, to our knowl-
edge, the largest collection of formalized mathematical texts for today.
Classical first-order logic was the choice of SAD, too. The SAD system does not adopt
any kind of set theory (or any other foundational theory) as the common basis for all
formalizations. We prefer to define a particular set of preliminaries for a problem under
consideration, choosing the basic concepts on the appropriate level of the development of
the theory. (In other words, SAD does not grow a tall tree but works in the garden of green
bushes.)
A special kind of logic was adopted in the Nqthm prover [36] and its successor, ACL2
[37]: quantifier-free first-order logic with the theory of inductively defined data structures.
This basis resembles the type-theoretic approach in that it is convenient to define recur-
sive functions and formalize induction-based reasoning over finitely generated domains
(integers, trees, etc.).
The Theorema project [38] works in higher-order predicate logic, enriched with se-
quence variables and binding constructions: lambda-abstractor, sum, limit, and so on.
Proof style Another important property of a proof assistant is what kind of input it takes.
Interactive systems are most often tactic-driven, meaning that a given statement is proved
by a sequence of instructions given to the system. These instructions, tactics, can be prim-
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routine or a decision procedure. Systems of that type are Isabelle, PVS, Coq, HOL and
others. Working with such a system is easy if it provides a terse set of powerful tactics
which is enough most of the time.
The systems of another kind accept the proofs written in the same language that axioms
and propositions to prove. Of course, this language must be extended with certain struc-
turing means to organize logic formulas in a proof. Then the system must autonomously
verify each proof step. Mizar and SAD are systems of that kind; and Isabelle, with in-
troduction of Isar [20] (a structured proof language imitating a language of mathematical
proofs) can be considered as a proof-driven system, too.
Though there are no “proof sections” in Nqthm and ACL2, they are also systems of
the second kind, where verification of a principal statement is supported with a number of
supplementary preceding lemmas.
Proof checkers like Automath are proof-driven systems by definition, though, in Au-
tomath, the proof is just a typed lambda-term inhabiting a type that represents a statement
being proved (many higher-order tactic-based proof assistants use the same representation
in the background).
Of course, the distinction is quite conditional. If one can prove theorems in a tactic-
driven proof assistant using mostly the tactics of intermediate goal introduction and of
automated subgoal closure, such a system can be as well seen as a proof-driven. If the
steps in a proof you submit to a proof-driven system should be supplied with detailed hints
to the verifier, such a system can be as well seen as a tactic-driven, with the tactics being
your hints (the case of Isar).
The systems using proof planning, such as λCLAM, 	MEGA, and IsaPlanner [39] stand
apart. In a proof planner, we do not supply a particular problem with a particular proof,
whether explicit or encoded in tactic applications. Instead, the system attempts to find the
proof without user assistance by generating a proof plan from the collection of general
proof methods whose usage is guided by method preconditions, various control rules, or
strategies. Of course, any proof method, control rule, or strategy is supposed to be applica-
ble in a quite large class of problems, not just for the problem in question.
Proof granularity The reasoning power of a mathematical assistant can be weaker or
stronger, requiring a user to perform more or less proof steps by himself: measured by the
number of instructions, in a tactic-driven system, or by the length of written proofs, in a
proof-driven one. Among the mathematical assistants, we can distinguish proof checkers
and “proof finders”. The former accept only those proofs where each step consists in an
inference rule application, and hence supplied proofs have to be fully detailed. Mizar is a
system of that kind, though the set of inference rules of Mizar is quite large. Automath is
another pure proof checker, with a different kind of proofs.
Systems which we called “proof finders” apply proof search or proof planning methods
and try to close the gaps by their own means. SAD, Nqthm (ACL2), Theorema are proof-
driven systems of that kind. λCLAM and 	MEGA, the systems using proof planning, should
be classified as proof finders, too.
Interactive tactic-driven systems usually have enhanceable sets of tactics, so that the
“reasoning power” is not specific to a system as such, and almost any tactic-driven system
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that one strongly needs to follow the suggested formalization style: if you try to prove
a complex theorem “at once”, without splitting it to a number of ad-hoc lemmas, without
using special tactics and existing libraries, the “proof construction dialog” quickly becomes
complex, wide-branched, and hardly traceable.
9. Future work
At present, the researches in the framework of the Evidence Algorithm advance in the
following directions:
Background prover: equality handling Efficient handling of equality in sequent-based or
tableau calculi stays a challenging problem for prover developers. Recently, we developed
an extension of the Model Elimination calculus with a lazy paramodulation rule [40] and
proved it to be complete in classical first-order logic with equality. This calculus, called
LPCT (for Lazy Paramodulation Connection Tableau), uses basic paramodulation and term
ordering. The corresponding modification of [Moses] is under development now.
Background prover: simple rules In ForTheL, any object is introduced as member of a
class described by some notion. The hierarchy of notions is, in essence, a kind of weak
typing system (not to confuse with the weak typing in WTT [22]), and, therefore, proving
that a given individual belongs to a given class is a frequently arising subgoal in inference
search. Quite often, this subgoal can be resolved with the help of what we call a simple rule.
In its general form, a simple rule is an implication of the form ∀v1, . . . , vnQ1(vi1)∧ · · · ∧
Qm(vim) ⊃ Q(s[v1, . . . , vn]), where Q,Q1, . . . ,Qm are unary predicate symbols. Given a
set of simple rules 
, an unary predicate symbol Q, and a ground term t , it is possible to
decide whether 
  Q(t) in polynomial time with respect to the length of t . This property
of simple rules allows to extend a resolution-based or a tableau-based calculus with a non-
destructive inference rule that, in case it can be applied, removes a literal from a clause (in
resolution) or closes a branch without substituting in the rest of the tree (in tableau).
Background prover: many-sorted language To be implemented consistently, the method
of second-order superposition combinators (Section 6) requires a prover to support sorts.
Foreground reasoner: definition expansion As our experience shows, definitions com-
plicate inference search when being passed to a prover “as is”. In particular, it is ex-
plained by their “double-edged”, self-applicable form. Consider the definition of the subset
relation: A ⊆ B ≡ ∀x(x ∈ A ⊃ x ∈ B). After a traditional clausification, this equiva-
lence turns into three clauses: (A  B ∨ x /∈ A ∨ x ∈ B), (sk(A,B) ∈ A ∨ A ⊆ B),
(sk(A,B) /∈ B ∨ A ⊆ B). The first clause resolves with the second one, producing the
clause (sk(A,B) ∈ A ∨ x /∈ A ∨ x ∈ B). The resulting clause is non-tautological and will
not be eliminated from the search space, yet it is completely useless.
At present, we investigate another approach: the reasoner does not include definitions
in a task for the prover; instead, provided the inference search fails, the reasoner expands
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but make some expansions in advance.
Foreground reasoner: recursive definitions This important extension is to be made soon
in SAD. A recursive definition must be a subject for verification: the existence of the de-
scribed object must be proved. A similar extension should be made to support the set
comprehension scheme. Of course, these modifications will concern ForTheL as well.
Language: tuples Mathematical objects defined as tuples are frequently met: a group is
defined as a triple (carrier set, multiplication, inverse), a graph as a pair (vertex set, edge
set), and so on. Support for the tuples, in particular, in definitions, is one of the facilities
lacking in ForTheL.
System as a whole The SAD team is currently working to provide SAD with tools for
maintaining a library of mathematical texts. The most important concern here is how to
estimate the (ir)relevance of a given fact with respect to the current proof task.
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